Published at MetaROR
April 10, 2026
Table of contents
The drain of scientific publishing
Fernanda Beigel1,2, Dan Brockington3,4,5
, Paolo Crosetto6
, Gemma Derrick7
, Aileen Fyfe8
, Pablo Gomez Barreiro9
, Mark A. Hanson10
, Stefanie Haustein11
, Vincent Larivière12,13,14
, Christine Noe15
, Stephen Pinfield16,17
, James Wilsdon17
1 Instituto de Ciencias Humanas y Ambientales-Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Mendoza, Argentina.
2 Centro de Estudios de la Circulación del Conocimiento-Universidad Nacional de Cuyo; Mendoza, Argentina.
3 ICREA; Pg. Lluís Companys 23, Barcelona, Spain.
4 Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ICTA-UAB); Barcelona, Spain.
5 Department of Private Law, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Barcelona, Spain.
6 Univ. Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, CNRS, Grenoble INP, GAEL; Grenoble, France
7 School of Education, University of Bristol; Bristol, UK.
8 School of History, University of St Andrews; St Andrews, UK
9 Department of Science Operations, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew; Wakehurst, UK.
10 Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter; Penryn, Cornwall, UK
11 Scholarly Communications Lab, School of Information Studies, University of Ottawa; Ottawa, Canada
12 Consortium Érudit, Université de Montréal; Montréal, Quebec, Canada.
13 Observatoire des Sciences et des Technologies, Université du Québec à Montréal; Montréal, Quebec, Canada.
14 DSI‐NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, Stellenbosch University; Stellenbosch, South Africa.
15 Department of Geography, University of Dar es Salaam; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
16 School of Information, Journalism and Communication, University of Sheffield; Sheffield, UK
17 Research on Research Institute (RoRI), Department of Science, Technology, Engineering & Public Policy, University College London; London, UK
Originally published on November 17, 2025 at:
Editors
Kathryn Zeiler
Jennifer Byrne
Editorial assessment
by Jennifer Byrne
Scientific publishing is supported by a highly profitable publishing industry. The extent to which this industry contributes towards and supports science therefore deserves critical analysis and reflection. In the preprint “The Drain of Scientific Publishing” , the authors argue that scientific publishing is dominated by commercial publishers based in the Global North, to the overall detriment of science. They call on funders, governments and universities to re-communalise publishing to better serve science.
The two reviewers of this preprint recognise the importance of the issues discussed. At the same time, both reviewers recognise that commercial publishers are not solely responsible for all problems that the authors describe. Reviewer 1 proposes the complicity of successful authors in helping to maintain the status quo in scientific publishing. Similarly, reviewer 2 recognises that author incentives also contribute to the use of paper mills and citation rings, and the inherent difficulty of separating author rewards from prestige. Reviewer 2 also recognizes that commercial publishers offer a service that no other entity is currently able to provide at a similar scale.
Both reviewers also queried some suggested solutions. Reviewer 2 recognises that previous disruptive top-down changes have not produced the desired results in publishing. Instead, the reviewer proposes a combination of top-down and bottom-up changes, recognising that these will need time to implement. The feasibility of directly purchasing influence with major commercial publishers was queried by reviewer 1, on account of the huge sums that would be required.
As more specific suggestions for improvement, reviewer 1 highlights that publication data are presented until 2022 (see also editor suggestion below). Including more recent data in Figure 1A could illuminate the impact of genAI on author publishing.
Suggestions from the editor:
- The request for “leading actors” to “lead” (page 8) speaks to the sense of exasperation that many readers might share. Nonetheless “opportunities to act” could outline specific actions that could feasibly achieved by key stakeholders.
- Figure 1C includes similar data shown in “The Strain on Scientific Publishing”, where the latest data shown is again for 2022. Adding data for 2025 would indicate whether publishing and/or special issue trends have continued during a period of greater awareness of rising numbers of publications in special issues, and during which ChatGPT and similar tools became available.
- The preprint includes several claims that aren’t supported by references.
- “…become a highly profitable industry.” (page 2)
- “…powerless to affect change.” (page 4)
- “…widespread difficulties recruiting reviewers.” (page 4)
- “…nudged away from riskier…long-term work.” (page 4)
- “…(if not necessarily guaranteeing quality).” (page 5)
- “…publishers’…need for vigilance.” (page 5)
- “…judge and jury in their own trials”. (page 6)
- “…failed merger…almost three decades ago.” (page 8)
- “…proven lever in changing corporate strategy.” (page 8)
- Please define all X and Y axes shown in Figure 1 within the figure panels.
- X and Y axis labels (Figure 1) and footnote information (Figure 1, Table 1, Table S1) is shown in very small font and is therefore difficult to read by eye.
Recommendations for enhanced transparency
- All data used to produce reported results should be made available for ease of result replication. Datasets should be assigned DOIs (or other persistent identifiers) and open licenses and published with proper documentation to ensure maximal reusability.
- All analytical code used to produce results, figures, and tables should be made publicly available in an appropriate repository (e.g., OSF, Zenodo, Dryad), and the article should contain a link to the code files. Analytical code files should be properly annotated. Consider including a codebook.
- Properly identify the statistical software used in the research, including version numbers. Identifying information should be reported in the text of the article, in an appendix, in supplementary materials, or in the source code and scripts documentation.
- Software packages (e.g., Stata, SPSS, SAS, R) used in the research should be cited in detail in the reference section.
For more information on these recommendations, please refer to our author guidelines.
Peer review 1
I have grouped my comments under three headings below, discussion comments, methodological comments, and some minor drafting comments. Overall, this is a strong, timely, and carefully argued manuscript that makes an important contribution to debates on scientific publishing, research integrity, and the political economy of knowledge production. The authors present a clear and compelling argument for the “four-fold drain” on science, and I very much appreciated the chance to comment on the manuscript.
DISCUSSION
1. The paper currently leaves the role of academics aside, and presents them largely as victims of the publishing industry. In my view, the reality is complex, because academics are entirely complicit. One of the biggest issues is that the academics with the most prestige and power, are also the academics who benefit most from the current system (lots of grant income to pay APCs, access to top journals, attendance at all the best conferences). They are also therefore the academics with the strongest incentives to preserve the status quo. Given the lack of change we have actually seen, I think it is reasonable to say that senior academics, especially in the Global North, are playing a role in preserving this comfortable (for them) status quo.
2. Where the authors comment that “the market has become more concentrated” it might be helpful to state that this is through a combination of market share gains from launching new journals and also the acquisition of journals and imprints. Springer Nature for example has been highly acquisitive, specifically targeting M&A activity as a means of growth and portfolio expansion.
3. AI is briefly mentioned, but the authors will be aware of the recent Nature paper flagging that research productivity is rising as researchers target data-rich fields – in other words, productivity is ‘choosing’ the topic area. We see this in the sharp explosion of papers analysing secondary data sources, including from paper mills.
4. A related point, the “damage caused by paper mills” is not really due to profits from publishers, this is very much caused by researcher behaviour, incentives, and a human desire for short cuts. Some of these trends are due to publishers, some are due to researchers (see Point 1).
5. The numbers of paper per researcher is only given up until 2022. This is now three years out of date, and the number of papers has grown massively (according to OpenAlex https://openalex.org/works by over 30% in 2025 versus 2024). This is likely AI driven, of course, but even if the authors cannot construct a time series of papers per researcher, they should report the recent explosion in papers and note that the situation has likely deteriorated much further.
6. The authors state that “the temptation [for publishers] will always be to pursue revenue over science” This is not a temptation. Publishers are mandated by their owners to pursue revenues and profits. I suggest to replace ‘temptation’ with ‘mandate from their owners’ in this sentence.
7. The authors state that the “one constant amidst all these reforms are publishers’ profits”. First, if there is one constant, it should be ‘is’ not ‘are’. Second, researcher desire for prestige and status has also been a constant, in fact predating the scientific publishing system. Newton was not averse to seeking out credit and fame! I would rephrase this to “two constants amidst all these reforms have been publishers’ profits combined with researchers’ desire for prestige and status”
8. “Radical action by the funders like taking shares in large publishing organizations and exerting pressure from within could also be given consideration” In a generally well-written and considered manuscript, this is the only line that I took very serious issue with. To achieve a significant minority share and e.g. obtain a place on the board would require a huge amount of money (for example buying 10% of Springer Nature alone would cost USD 400 million or so), and which country would own the shares? This is out of any reasonable scope of action, in my view, and weakens the argument
METHODS
9. The authors might want to reconsider using EBITDA. This is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. The reality is that companies do have capex and do have to depreciate and amortise this. EBITDA is a weak proxy for cashflow, which can be used to service shareholders, capex, tax and debt holders. Adjusted profit is probably conceptually better for what the authors are trying to show here.
DRAFTING
10. EBITDA should be explained somewhere, if the authors want to use it, as should adjusted operating profit. EBITDA is earning before tax, depreciation and amortisation, and adjusted operating profit is generally taken to be profits before tax and adjusted for non-recurring items, to give an indicator of sustainable profitability.
11. Table 1 should specify EBITDA or adjusted profit. There is space to do this, and just showing ‘profit’ is misleading when the actual measures are different.
12. Also Table 1, I think for the Source might be more helpful to readers to show more than just “(3)”
13. The authors are inconsistent on currencies, and should use USD (the standard three letter abbreviation for UIS dollars) or US$ throughout. At the moment there is a mixture, for example “charging North American researchers over US$2.27 billion. The National Science Foundation budget that year was $ 9.1 billion and that of NSERC in Canada 1.1 billion”
14. Very minor, but the authors do not capitalise Universe when it should be, as it is a proper noun, but do capitalise universities, which do not need to be capitalised. For example, “our understanding of humanity, life and the universe” and “members of the research community – funders, governments and Universities” in the text. Capitalisation is a little spotty throughout and an editorial sweep for these issues might help.
15. Table S1 is rather unclear, as the mean “margin” in the right most column is very different in each case to the “Mean industry net profit margin” in the first row. This needs clarification or explanation, as currently the numbers – on my understanding – do not match.
Peer review 2
The authors reflect on how the crucial role scientific publishing plays in disseminating scientific knowledge can be affected, and even harmed, when interference or tensions arise with its other two relevant roles: a) element of prestige assessment (both of academics and their published works) and b) product that allows commercial publishers to generate profits. The imbalance between these three roles carries the risk of overexploitation of four essential resources of the research system: money, time, trust and control, to the detriment of the advancement of scientific knowledge. The authors argue that, consequently, there is a risk of continuing and even exacerbating this drain of resources if measures are not taken to stop it by means of reshaping researchers’ incentives and rewards so they choose to publish in non- commercial venues, in conjunction with strong support from funders to foster publishing outside of commercial venues.
However, I’m not too sure that “stringent reforms” to generate “disruptive change” are the best way to reduce resource drain and promote “re-communalization” as proposed. While acknowledging the leadership role played by funders, universities, research centers, or any institution with researchers’ promotion/assessment responsibilities, as well as researchers themselves, experience has shown that attempting disruptive changes through a top-down approach has not produced the expected results. The same authors refer to how the Open Access mandate has ultimately contributed to resource drain.
The case of Coalition S, which established the requirement for fully Open Access journals publications from 2021, marking as non-compliant the transformative agreements, is paradigmatic in my opinion. In this framework, the Scientific Council of the European Research Council decided to leave Coalition S, for such a requirement was considered to “be detrimental, especially for early career researchers, researchers working in countries with fewer alternative funding opportunities or working in fields in which Open Access policies are more difficult to implement” (https://erc.europa.eu/news/erc-scientific-council-calls-open-access-plans-respect-researchers-needs). Eventually, the very same Coalition S reviewed in 2024 the requirements and impact of Plan S.
Additionally, imposing venues for publications may generate tensions among members of multi-national research teams and, more importantly, collides with researchers’ freedom to choose the publication venue they may consider more appropriate. For example, without underestimating publication in other languages than English, when looking for maximum dissemination of research results, we must acknowledge that publishing in English is the best option so far.
I believe that, in light of these previous experiences, a combination of top-down and bottom- up approaches could produce better and more lasting results. Top-down measures could involve: a) leading by example, with recognized researchers demonstrating their commitment to quality over quantity by slowing down their own scientific output; and b) promoting and supporting alternative publishing platforms and models such as publish-review-curate.
Bottom-up measures, on the other hand, should focus on creating high-quality publishing platforms that earn the respect of the scientific community. Any of these initiatives undoubtedly require time.
Regarding the role of commercial publishers in extracting money from research, I believe it’s important to clarify that these publishers offer a service that no other entity is currently able to provide since there are not enough Diamond Open Access platforms/journals to replace them. For example, not all researchers can aspire to publish in the European Open Research Europe (ORE) but just those who meet certain criteria are eligible (https://open-research-europe.ec.europa.eu/about/eligibility).
Certainly, an extraordinary amount of resources is allocated to Article Processing Charges (APCs). However, I can’t help but think that a more gradual adaptation to open access, with less urgency and pressure (e.g., PlanS), along with the creation and strengthening of Diamond Open Access journals/platforms, would have created an environment less conducive to the exploitation of Gold Open Access.
More generally speaking, related with the open access movement’s aim of quickly spreading knowledge, I believe it is important to find a way of setting “external marks of quality” for the articles/documents published, in order to help non-expert readers to judge its quality. It has to be considered that the general public (and, therefore, non-academics) will most probably lack the ability/training to understand the specialized content of a scientific article which will probably compromise their understanding.
Finally, I wonder if it is even possible to eliminate rewards linked to prestige. If peer review is to be compensated (economically?), wouldn’t it create a perverse incentive to prompt some individuals to perform many rather superficial review reports just to earn money or prestige? And how would the quality of a paper be established/measured? Even though I am not unaware of the limitations of quantitative indicators for research assessment, in my opinion, a purely qualitative assessment could hardly be possible (particularly in countries with a high number of researchers to be evaluated by national bodies), not to forget the risk of purely subjective evaluation. Since accountability is a requirement for public funds allocation, how could this be afforded without a group of quantitative measures? And, more importantly, whatever indicators were used for assessment, couldn’t they be gamed somehow? Therefore, together with a change in the incentives, shouldn’t sanctions be set in the framework of accountability for those perverting the spirit and gaming the new system created?
Specific comments
The authors state that the growth in papers published is driven by pressure for profit rather than scholarly imperatives. However, if “scholarly” is understood as being part of the academia, I do believe there is such an imperative in order to get secure jobs, funds and promotions, as the authors acknowledge. Perhaps “scientific” imperatives would be a clearer term.
Can you further develop how publishers’ historical space constraints incentivize their and editors’ vigilance? Do you mean, they need to be very selective when deciding what to publish? If so, it is a bit confusing for me for I understand vigilance as being alert in search of any danger (let’s say any fraud) while selective is to choose the very best, as opposed to meaning what is rejected is a danger.
Authors mention peer review rings, paper mills and AI-generated fraud as evidence of systematic problems “powerfully shaped by for-profit incentives”. These and other types of fraud are, sadly, very relevant issues within the research system but to explain them, the individuals’ role cannot be ignored. If individuals had no role to play in all forms of fraud/misconduct, every single researcher would respond in the same way to the same incentives within the same publishers’ environment and that is not the case. So, both systemic and individual factors explain misconduct and, I believe, the for-profit publishers are not the only one to be blamed.
Additionally, regarding reshaping incentives, the CoARA initiative has been promoted in order to produce a “systemic reform of research assessment within a set timeframe, based on a common set of principles and commitments” successfully and quickly gathering more than 700 signatories (research organisations, funders, assessment authorities, professional societies, and their associations) (https://www.coara.org/). In Spain, for example, changes in researcher evaluation’s system prompted by CoARA have fostered the green open access (Arroyo- Machado & Torres-Salinas, 2026). However, some warnings are on the table (Abramo, 2024; Baccini, 2025). Shouldn’t we refrain from the impulse to rapidly produce changes without a previous detailed analysis of the implications in order to avoid unintended consequences?
References
Abramo, G. (2024). The forced battle between peer-review and scientometric research assessment: Why the CoARA initiative is unsound. Research Evaluation, rvae021. https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvae021
Arroyo-Machado, W., Torres-Salinas, D. Research assessment by ANECA drives green open access in Spain. Scientometrics 131, 801–804 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-026-05545-w
Baccini, A. (2025). COARA will not save science from the tyranny of administrative evaluation. Research Evaluation, 34, rvaf024. https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvaf024





